Exchange rate constraints and money control in Korea by Gyuhan Kim
WORKING PAPER SERIES




FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS
Research Division
411 Locust Street
St. Louis, MO 63102
______________________________________________________________________________________
The views expressed are those of the individual authors and do not necessarily reflect official positions of
the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, the Federal Reserve System, or the Board of Governors.
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers are preliminary materials circulated to stimulate
discussion and critical comment. References in publications to Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working
Papers (other than an acknowledgment that the writer has had access to unpublished material) should be
cleared with the author or authors.
Photo courtesy of The Gateway Arch, St. Louis, MO.   www.gatewayarch.comEXCHANGE RATE CONSTRAINTS AND MONEY CONTROL IN KOREA
July 1995
JEL CLASSIFICATION: E51, E58, F31, F32
KEYWORDS: Capital mobility, Money control, Offset coefficient, Sterilization policies
Gyuhan Kim
Visiting Scholar, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis
and Senior Economist
Institute for Monetary & Economic Studies
The Bank ofKorea
110, 3-Ga, Namdaemun-Ro, Jung-Gu
Seoul, Korea
The author wishes to thank Bill Dewald, Cletus Coughlin, Bill Gavin, Patricia Pollard, Chris
Neely and Mike Pakko for their helpful comments and suggestions and Richard Taylor for
research assistance.Abstract
This paper applies two traditional empirical approachesto investigate how successfully Korea
managed to control money supply in response to the changes in foreign reserves since 1980. One
is to estimateoffset coefficientsand the other is to estimate sterilization coefficients. The
estimation results are asfollows. Reflectingstrict and effectivecapital controls,the domestic
monetary policies were partially offset mainly by short-termcapital flows. The Bank ofKorea
pursued sterilization policies very actively. Particularly,sterilization was more active during the
late 1980s ofhuge current account surplusthan during the early 1990sof a surge in capital flows.
There were over-sterilization during theearly 1980swhenforeign reserves kept dropping, which
implied that monetary policies were directed to worseningthe balance ofpaymentsdeficit rather
thanimproving it.I. Introduction
In small open economies with exchange rate constraints and high capital mobility, the
scope ofmonetary control is greatly limited by the offsetting changes in foreign exchange
reserves mainly by capital flows, unless the centralbanks actively sterilize them.
During the 1980s after a long period offixedexchange rate system, Korea adopted
multiple pegged exchange rate system which allowed exchange rates to change frequently but
mostly under thegovernment control. Korea, therefore, had to continue strict capitalcontrols in
order to ensure monetary control. They experienced and are nowexperiencing big pressure of
money growthfrom theforeign sector: a huge current account surplus in the late 1980s and a
surge in capital inflows in the 1990s. Korea is now speeding up deregulating capital transactions,
and it will damage thecontrollability ofmoney supply, unless theymove toward free floating
exchange rate system.
This article deals with an issue ofhow successfully Korea managed to control money
supply under exchange rate constraintssince 1980. First, the effectiveness ofcapital controls is
explored by estimating offset coefficients. Secondly, the sterilization policies ofthe Bank of
Korea are investigatedby estimating sterilization coefficients.
This paperproceeds as follows. In section two, a general discussion is presented on the
controllability ofmoney supply under exchange rate constraints. In section three, the Korean
monetary experiences are describedin some detail. In section four, some pieces of relevant
empirical studies are undertaken, and the final section five is reserved for evaluation and
prospects as a conclusion.
1IL General Discussion
The swings ofmoney supply through the foreign sectorare unavoidable under exchange
rate constraints, because exchange rates do not move freelyto removethe balance ofpayments
imbalance. This gives much trouble to thecentral bank ofa small open economyin keeping
money supply under control. Particularly, capital market linkages amongcountries limit
substantiallythe controllability ofthe national monetary authorities over the money supply and
thedomestic interest rates through offsettingcapital flows (Frenken,J.A.&M.L.Mussa[l981]).
For example, a decrease in the domestic credit to combat the inflationarypressuremay increase
domestic interest rates or enforce firms to finance abroad, and thus will induce a capital inflow
and corresponding increase in foreignexchange reserves that will rapidly increase the money
supply back.
The unfavorable effects oftheseoffsetting capital flows on money control were
empiricallyfound in WestGermanyduring theperiod offixed exchange ratesystem between
1960 and 1972 (Porter[1972], Kouri & Porter{1974], Neuman[1978], Obstfeld[l980]), and in
some South American countries suchas Columbia, Mexico, Venezueladuring the 1970s when
thesecountries ran the crawling peg exchange rate system(Cumby & Obstfeld[1981],
Kamas[1986], Rennhack& Bonangelino[1988]).
During the 1970s therewere lots ofresearch on these offsetting capital flows to see how
feasible monetary control canbe under fixed exchange rate system and high capital mobility. An
assertionwas made on the basis ofthe monetary approachto the balance ofpayments that
monetary control is totally infeasible in the short runas well as in the long run becauseof
2complete offsetting capital flows responding to the domestic interest rate
movements(Mundell[1961], Swoboda[l973]). According to theirview any attempt to sterilize
capital flows through domestic credit measures cannot succeed, even temporarilybecause it
induces anotheroffsetting massive capital flows without the initial moneyeffects of monetary
policy measures.’ There was a different view that moneycontrol is somewhat feasible ,because
capital flows can not offset domestic monetary policy completely in a real case where bonds
denominatedin different currencies arenot perfect substitutes(Branson[1970], Obstfeld [1980]).
They had a different view on the capital movements: capital movements arenot simply
continuing flows offoreign exchange but largely once-and-for-all stock adjustments ofinvestors
portfolios made in response to change in interest ratedifferentials. They insist that the
sterilization policies ofa central bank mayinsulate domestic money supply from changes in
foreign exchange reserves at least in theshort runor medium run. But, in thelong run,
sterilization cannot sustain a money supply that differs from the equilibrium level ofmoney
demand.
From the practical and theoretical prospective, we canconclude that whether a small
country can control money supply properly under exchange rate constraints depends not only on
how effectively a countrycan control capital flows to prevent them from offsetting changes in
domestic credit but also on howactively a central bank sterilizes changes in foreign exchange
reserves in a world ofhighly integratedcapital markets.
~ Some critics were made respect to this assertion. (1) ifwe take outside money into consideration,
complete offset is not possibleunder perfect capital mobility (Fratianni[1977]), (2) complete offset by capital flows
are not sufficient condition for an emasculated monetary control (Kanniainen[1977]).
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1) Index, in terms of foreign currencies, calculated based on exchange rates
Japan, England, Germany, Canada, Singapore, Taiwan) (1985 = 100).
2) Index, in terms of U.S. dollars (1985=100).

















Real effective Exchange Rate *III. The Korean Experience
Foreign Exchange and Capital Controls
In Korea, up until 1990 the exchange rates were not determinedin themarket but
controlled by the authorities.2 During this time the exchange rates were controlled to satisfy
purchasing power parity condition by and largelest the exporting goods should be
uncompetitive in the world market by theunfavorable exchange rates movements. This was
considered necessarybecause export growth wasessential forthe continued economic growth.
As the foreignexchange market grew rapidly in size, a newexchange ratesystem, so-called
market-average exchange rate system, wasadopted in March 1990 to allow market forces to
determine thewon/dollar ratein the domestic foreignexchange market within a band set by the
authorities.3
Reflectingthese realities, the movements ofthenominal and real exchange were closely
related to current account position asshown graph l.~Duringthe periodofcurrentaccount
2 From early 1970s until January 1980, Koreamaintained apeg to the U.S. dollar. Subsequently, it was
replaced by themultiple-basket pegged system in which the exchange rates were set by the authorities daily on the
basis of a basket of currencies comprising atrade-weightedbasket and SDR basket as well as ofjudgements of
authorities on the other economic factors suchas domestic and foreign price trends, and the balance of payments
position. Under this system theexchange rates were floating but managed by the authorities to keep them at the
desired level.
~ Underthe new system, the daily exchange rate is determined by the weighted averageof won-dollar
transactions conducted on the previous business day among foreign exchange banks with a band set by the
authorities. This band was widened from 0.4% above or below the prevailingrate to0.6% in September 1991 and
was again enlarged to 0.8% in July 1992 and was further expanded to 1.0% in October 1993 in order to enhancethe
role ofthe exchange rate as a price variable andboost market transactions.
It is empirically asserted that the changes in nominal exchange rates had clear effects on the trade
balance as theory indicates in Korea.
4deficit( 1980-1985),both the nominal and realexchange rates continued to rise(won depreciated),
while they dropped(won appreciated) considerably during the period ofsurplus(1986-1989).
SinceKorea opened its stock market partially in 1992, they are greatly affected by the capital
flows.
Underthese exchange rate constraints, Korea had to put strict controls on the capital
flows in order to enhance monetary control.5 Until early 1990s when the capital market
liberalization proceeded rapidly, most ofthe capital transactions taking place out ofpurely
financial motives were prohibited and only those which had some connections with real sector
were permitted with limits. Reflecting these controls on capital transactions, most ofthe capital
transactions during 1980s were real-sector-related ones such as loans, trade credit, and direct
investment as shown table 1. However, since 1990 capital transactions out offinancial motives in
the form ofequities and debenture issued surged enough to give trouble in controlling money
stock. It is also remarkable that both the capital controls and its relaxations6have been pursued as
one ofthe efforts to effectively control money supply. Forexample, during the latter part of
1980swhen persistent current account surpluswas a big pressure formoney growth,the capital
outflows were deregulated, while capital inflow were keptunder strict control, and vice versa.
5 . ..
The other aims of capital controls are (I) to channel foreign saving to the strategically important sectors,
and (ii) to protect the underdeveloped domestic financialsectors from outside competition,(iii) to make efficient use
of limited foreign currency funds.
6 Since the early 1980s a number ofmeasures have been taken to remove orease these controls. The
government substantially loosened the foreign exchange concentration system and theceilings ofthe exchange
position of foreign exchange banks has been raised several times. It also abolished or relaxed the regulations on
capital transactions suchas foreign investments and overseas portfolio investment. Noticeably, the Korean
securities market werepartially opened in January, 1992 by allowing foreign securities companies to own up to 10%
of the paid-in capital oflarge Korean securities companies.
5Table 1: Capital Flow Trend in Korea
(million dollars)
1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994
inflow outflow inflow outflow inflow outflow
loans!) 17542 8077 12402 23629 4258 10583
direct investment
domestic 574 125 3103 195 4524 660
abroad -- 347 1016 862 7217
portfolio investment
domestic 799 165 2175 1437 40005 12233
abroad -- 1012 1083 9420 10321
import credit 59803 57913 71060 71047 150410 144407
short-term 58259 56238 69232 69670 146377 141147
long-term 1544 1675 1828 1377 4033 3260
export credit 8176 9021 9165 10635 24494 20462
short-term 3287 3099 1545 2196 2582 2876
long-term 4889 5922 7620 8439 21912 17586
total2) 86894 75301 99264 109042 233973 205883
1) public loans + commercial loans + bank loans
2) The other items which have net balance such as advances under red-clause L/C are
excluded
6Foreign Reserve Changes and Money Control
Due to the wide opening ofKorean economy to the world, combined with relatively
inflexible exchange rate, the foreignreserves havebeen a dominant source ofthereserve base in
Korea as shown in graph 2. During theearly 1980s when Korea continued to have balance of
payment deficit, domestic monetary policy couldenjoy degree offreedom, because foreign
sectorwas a net reserve demand sector. But, sincethe late 1980s foreign reserves developed
hardships in keeping moneygrowth at thetarget rate,because it switched to a net supply sector.7
A huge current account surplus between 1986 and 1989 was a big pressure for money
growth, which threatenedto accelerate inflation and had long served to absorb liquidity since
then. The active sterilization policies were pursuedto keep moneygrowthunder control.
Domestic credit wasgreatly contracted through a substantial reduction in policy loans and a
tighter control over bank loans to large firms. Since itwas not enough, sales ofmonetary
stabilizationbonds by the Bank ofKorea exploded and reserve requirements ratios were
increased more than double to absorb the liquidity. In addition to these monetary reactions, the
government allowed the won to appreciate against the dollar, restricted some capital inflows, and
liberalized some capital outflows.
As the restrictions on capital flows were remarkably lifted in theearly 1990s ,ie a partial
opening ofstock market in January 1992, the surge in capital inflows continuously expands
7 Since 1957 Korea has established monetary targeting as the basic monetary policy regime in order to
efficiently tackle the inflationary pressures. The annual target rates of money growth are set mainly on the basis of
real GNP growth rateand target inflation rate. From 1979 onwards, a certain point(recently a certain range)of
annual growth rateof Consisting of currencyin circulation plus total deposits of banking institutions has been a
main monetary target.
















1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94foreign reserves in spite ofrecent consecutive currentaccount deficit as shown table 2. Since this
huge capital inflow is putting tremendouspressure forwon appreciation, the purchase offoreign
exchange by the centralbank is requiredto keepexchange rateat proper level. This intervention
in the market necessitates the central bank to practice sterilization policies to keep money growth
at target level.
Table 2: Balance ofPayments Trend in Korea
(net, million dollars)





-11,162 33,686 -2,179 -8,728 -4,528 385 -4,778
7,980 -12,916 3,882 4,227 8,343 6,879 9,086
8,511 -13,913 548 4,186 7,233 8,900 6,134
-531 997 3,334 41 1,110 -2,021 2,952
overall account -7,605 21,530 -274 -3,741 4,898 6,542 2,802
Even if the Bank ofKorea struggled to keep money growthunder control against the
external pressure asdescribed above , it is undeniable that the movements offoreign exchange
reserves had significanteffects on money growthand thus inflation asshown in graph 3. During
the early 1980s Korea could sustain low inflation rate except 1980 and 1981 when Korea had the
second oil shock thanks to relatively lower rate ofmonetary base growth. But after 1986 the rate
ofmoney growth(M2) rosesubstantially due to the continued huge current account surplus,
which put Korea under tremendous inflationarypressure even until early 1990s. The recent
increase in the rateofmonetary base is believed to be associated with a surge in capital flows.
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-- __ -- - Inflation (CPI)IV. Empirical Findings
In this section two pieces of empirical studies are presented to investigate how
effectively Korea managed to control money stock in response to big changes in foreign reserves
since 1980: both offset coefficients and sterilizationcoefficients are estimated.
(1) offsetting capital flows
One oftheempirical approaches to measure the controllability of themoney stock is to
estimate the offset coefficient: the fraction ofa givenchange in the domestic credit that is offset
by capital flows. Traditionally, the offset coefficient was estimatedin the context ofmonetarist
or portfolio balancemodel in either oftwo ways.The reduced capital-flow equation is estimated
directly; alternatively, thestructural asset demandequations are estimated, and then,the offset
coefficient is calculated from the estimatedinterest-sensitivities.8
Inthis paper, theoffset coefficients are estimatedin a reduced-form model ofcapital
flows developed from a general equilibrium model ofthe Korean financial markets.
Accommodating the theoretically derived capital-flowequation as much as possible9, the
following capital-flowequation is set up forestimation. Model derivationand sources of data
8 The reduced-form estimates tend to be biased toward -1 if the central banks systematically attempt to
sterilize reserve flows( Kouri and Porter 1974, Obstfeld 1982) or unless speculating capital flows are properly
captured in the capital flow equation(Obstfeld 1982, Laskar 1982). The structural estimates are biased toward 0 if
private agents internalize the governmentbudget constraint(Pasula 1994).
~ Among the explanatory variables in the derived capital flows equation, the change in capital transactions
motivated by the capital market liberalization is captured by a dummy variable representing partial stock market
opening in 1992.1 and the capital flows accompanied by trade is reflected thecurrent account.
9used in regressionsare provided in Appendices.
TC~= a0
+ a,L~.NDA~ + a2CA~+ a3LI(i * + E)1
+ a4LXY~+ a5LXW~+ a6DUMMY+ e~
Here, TC is capital inflow, NDA is domestic source ofmonetary base, CA is current
account surplus, 1* is foreign exchange rate, E is expected rate of depreciation, Y is real income,
W is nominal wealth, DUMMY is a dummyvariable representing theperiod afterJanuary, 1992,
and ~is a disturbance term. In order to find out sources ofoffsetting capital flows in more detail,
some ofthe combinations ofshort-termcapital flows, long-term capital flows, and error &
omissions areused as dependent variables in the capital-flowequation. The estimation results are
provided in Table ~
Some implications can be drawn from theseestimation results. First, in spiteof
10 The Hausman’s test for exogeneity is applied in order to detect the problem of simultaneous bias
which may come from the endogeneity of thedomestic credit variable i~NDAt. To implement the Hausman test, add
to (1) the variable ~NDAt, which is the predicted value from an OLS regression of ~NDAt on the instrumental
variables ,includingthe other regressors in (1). The hypothesis of no simultaneous bias is equivalentto the
hypothesis that the coefficient of ANDAt is zero. The result of OLS estimation (with t-statistics in parentheses) is
TCI -32.72- 0.35 1 ANDAt - 0.496CAe - 159.6 A(I*+ E)t + 0.452 Ayt + 0.616 AWt - 0.045 ANÔAt +
(1.359) (0.214) (3.182) (0.234) (3.190) (5.887) (1.278)
1102.1DUMMY R2=0.708, DW= 1.801
(2.140)
The hypothesis that the coefficient of ANÔAt is zero is not rejected. So OLS or GLS regression methods are
applied for estimation. As shown in table the estimated offsettingcoefficient using 2SLS method makes little
difference.
10Table 3: Capital Flow Equation (1980:1to 1994:4)






























































































1) t-statics are in parentheses. TC1 = STC+LTC, TC2= TC1+ERR(Graph 4): Domestic and Foreign Interest Rate Differential
Quarterly Data
1) Corporate bond yield rate (3 Year maturity).
2) LIBO (3 months) + expected rate of depreciation.
Percent
1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94strictcapital controls in Korea, monetary policies were partiallyoffset by capital flows, mainly
the short-termcapital transactions. Because the regulations on the portfolio transactions were
extremely strict, these offsetting capital flows were largely associated with borrowing and
repayments by firms ornon-bank financial institutions rather than interest-sensitive capital flows
like portfolio investment. Short-termborrowingare mainly connected with import transaction,
while long-term borrowing arecomposed ofbank loans, commercial loans, trade credits,
debentures issued. These offsetting capital transactions were made by large firms in order to
substitute domestic sources offund forforeign sources wheneverloan availability ran out
domestically in the eventoftight monetary policies. Moreover, they could take cost advantage
over domestic loans by borrowing money abroad, becauseforeign interest rates stayed mostly far
lower than domestic interest ratesas shown in graph 3. As capital market liberalization proceeds
rapidly during 1990s, the portion ofinterest-sensitive capital flows which offset monetary policy
is suspected to rise. Secondly, capital flows in Korea are more associated with monetary policies
or current account than portfolio choice behavior. Particularly, short-termcapital flows were
largely motivated by monetary conditions, and trade transactions, while long-term capital
transactions were largely made to offset currentaccount imbalances. This can be wellexplained
by the estimation results that the explanatory variables such as foreign interest rate, domestic
income and wealth are much less significant than other variables like changes in domestic source
ofmoney supply and currentaccount. This reflects the factthat there were stringent restrictions
on portfolio adjustments in financial markets. Thirdly, the frequent changes in reserve
requirementratio during 1980s were not detected to causeoffsetting capital flows. This implies
that reserverequirementpolicies were not so effective as to influence the liquidity conditions in
11the market.
(2) sterilization policies
The ability to neutralize changes in foreign reserves originatingin persistentbalance of
payment imbalancesorforeign exchange market intervention is a prerequisiteforcontrolling
money supply in non-reserve economies. Thus, many centralbanks are undertaking active
sterilization policies to maintain their controllability ofmoney stock.
Sterilization policies are systematic attempts by the central banks to neutralize the
monetary impact ofchanges in theirforeign reserves by opposite movements in theirholdings of
domestic assets. Thebasic way we measurethe degreeofsterilization by a central bank is by
estimating a money-supply reaction function which provides a formal statement ofthebehavior
ofthe monetary authorities. The degree ofsterilization is measuredby the sterilization coefficient
- coefficient ofnet foreign asset in the reaction function.
Following Cumby and Obstfeld(198l),the money supply reactionfunction forthe Bank
ofKorea is modeled asa function ofchange in net foreign assets, government deficit, real
effective exchange rate and production growth.~
~ Since the Bank of Korea views the transmission of monetary policy as depending on M2 rather than
bankreserves, ~ NDA , is NFA and BUDDEFT are scaled by the predetermined , required reserve ratio. After
multiplying through by the predetermined, required reserveratio(q~1), I obtain the expression for the money supply




+ a2BUDDEFT~+ a3q~1REER~ + a4q11GIPI~++ ci
i=!
Here, NFA is netforeign asset ofthe Bank ofKorea, BUDDEFT is governmentdeficit, REER is
real effective exchange rate , and GIPI is industrial production growth, Si is seasonal dummies, q
is reserve requirement ratio, and c is a disturbance term. The coefficient a1 is the sterilization
coefficient, which measures the extent to which the Bank of Korea attempts to neutralize the
money creation resulting from change in its foreign reserves through countervailing domestic
monetary measures. If a1 is 0, then there is no sterilization ,becausethe balance ofpayments lead
to a proportionate increase in the money supply. If a1 is -1, then complete sterilization is
practiced. Values of a1 between -1 and 0 indicate partial sterilization. 12
First, the money-supply reaction function is estimated over the period from 1980:1 to
1994:1 applying GLS and 2SLS method. Then, it is estimatedseparately during two periods of
balance ofpayment deficit and surplus to compare the sterilization behaviorofthe Bank ofKorea
between them. The estimation results are provided in table 4~13
12 A positive value of a1 would be an evidence that monetary policy aimed at external balance rather than
internal one.
13 The Hausman’s testfor exogenety is also applied to detect theproblem of simultaneous bias in the
equation. The hypothesis of no simultaneous bias is not rejected. As shown in table 4, the estimated sterilization
coefficients using 2SLS method makes a small difference.
ANDA = 258.0-0.756 ANFA + 0,307 BUDDEFT + 46.77 q,
1
REER, - 920.8 qGIPI, + 0.196 AN~A-
(0.627) (7.502) (4.400) (2.523) (2.512) (1.497)













Sl S2 S3 R2 p D.W
80:1-94:4
GLS 441.5 -0.640 -0.701 0.282 46.40 -104.6 -1406 -263 -169 0.780 -0.57 2.23
(1.11) (9.82) (10.40) (4.11) (2.48) (2.80) (2.34) (0.87) (0.28)
2SLS 267.9 -0.558 0.306 45.92 -942.5 -1192 -161 -50 -0.57 2.09
(0.57) (6.36) (3.67) (2.09) (1.99) (1.75) (0.44) (0.07)
SURPLUS 337.4 -0.664 -0.731 0.306 49.07 -910.6 -1080 -148 -15 0.755 -0.57 2.07
(0.81) (9.05) (9.70) (4.27) (2.48) (2.37) (1.72) (0.47) (0.02)
DEFICIT -223.9 -2.802 -2.86 0.355 44.1 -1188.2 -1643 -75 -234 0.532 2.27
(0.41) (4.28) (4.16) (3.67) (1.11) (2.32) (2.45) (0.16) (0.37)
1) t-statics are in parentheses.
2) Thecolunms of~NFA(1) and ~NFA(2) represent estimated coefficientsof L~.NFA when the dependent variable is AB - I~TNFA
and i~B - ~NFA - E~RR respectively.(Graph 5): The Bank of Korea: Changes in Domestic and Foreign Assets
Quarterly Data
Billions ofWon
1980 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94
* Foreign currency deposits at domestic banks by the Bank of Korea is included.All the coefficients have the expected signs. The estimation results providestrong evidence that
the Bank ofKorea pursued a policy of systematicsterilization as easily seen in graph 4. During
the period ofbalance ofpayments deficit mostlyfrom 1980 to 1985, over-sterilization policies
were pursued. They were intended to support the economicgrowth by a rapid increase in
domestic credit even though tight monetary policies were necessary to combat the balance of
payment imbalance. During the surplusperiod, active sterilization policies were practiced to
reduce theinflation pressure acceleratedby thesurge in money supply from theforeign sector. In
addition to this, the extend to which theBank ofKorea attempted to sterilize the increase in
foreign reserves is compared between during the period ofcurrent account surplus and therecent
period ofcapital account surplus using a dummy variable.
zXNDA1
= 285.7 - 0.5 16 ANFA1 -0.219 A(NFAD)1 + 0.341BUDDEFT1 +
(0.687) (5.013) (1.942) (4.786)
28.51 q11REER11 -811.86 q~..1GIPI1,2 -771.9 Si + 31.13 S2 + 191.1 S3
(1.316) (2.161) (1.177) (0.100) (0.297)
R2
= 0.780, DW= 2.228, p = -0.570
The above resultshows that theBank ofKorea pursued more activesterilization policies during
theperiod ofcurrent account surplus in the late 1980sthan recent period ofcapital account
surplus. This resultcanbe explained by the facts that during recent period (1) sterilization policy
instruments suchas monetary stabilization bond which were most frequently usedare severely
limited due to the burden ofinterest payments (2)exchange rates are becoming moreflexible
14enough to absorb the external monetary disturbances (3) changes in foreignreserves are more
frequent sothat it is hard to neutralize them effectively and consistently.
15V. Conclusion
Under the exchange rateconstraints, the moreeffective the capital controls and the more
activethe sterilization policies are, the more effectively a centralbank can controlmoney supply.
This paper applied two traditional empirical approaches to investigate how effectively Korea
managed to control money supply in response to the changes in foreign reserves since 1980s.
Oneis to estimate offset coefficients which measure theeffectiveness ofcapital controls and the
other is to estimate sterilization coefficientswhich informhow actively themonetary policies are
directed to offset the changesin foreign reserves to keep money supply under control.
Theestimation results areas follows. SinceKorea undertook capital controls strictly
and effectively, only some ofcapital transactions suchas trade credits and loans were able to
offset domestic monetary policies to some degree. Moreover, theBank ofKorea pursued
sterilizationpolicies very actively.Particularly, sterilization was stronger and almost complete
during late 1980s ofhuge current account surplus than early l990s ofa surge in capital flows.
There were over-sterilizations during early 1980swhen foreignreserves kept dropping, which
implied that monetary policies were directed to worsening the balance ofpayments deficitrather
than improving it.
Since 1990s the interest rates and capital transactions has been deregulatedvery rapidly
in Korea, it is essential forKorea to move quickly toward more flexible exchange rate system to
maintain controlling money supply to a desirable extent.
16Appendix I
Derivation ofreduced-form capital flowequation
Suppose that there are fourfinancial assets in a small open economy; money,
government bond, foreign financial assets, and other domestic financial assets owned by
foreigners. And this economy is composed ofthree sectors i.e, government, private sector, and
foreign sector.The government sector includes the central bank, while thebanking sector is a
part ofthe private sector. This economy undertakes capital control which limits thekind and
amount offinancial assets that private sectorobtains and supplies abroad. Thus, it is assumed
that theprivate sector is allowed to own some portion(oc0)ofthe amount offoreign assets that
otherwise they would have, and to supply some portion(~35) ofdomestic financial assets that
otherwise they would supply. Besides, foreigners are not allowed to owndomestic currency and
government bond, but can own equity and claims on loans such as bank loans, tradecredits,
commercial loans, and so on. Then thegeneral equilibrium portfolio balance model ofthis
economy is expressed as follows.
The demandforreserve base is given by
M~=pL(I,y,W) (1)
The demand forgovernment bond (BG) is
BGd = F( I, y, W) (2)
17The realized demand for foreign financial assets(B*) is
B*d= aJ( I, I*+ E, y, W) (3)
The realizedsupply ofdomestic financial assets to foreigners(BF) is
BFs = ~3H( I,f+ E, y) (4)
Here, M is reserve base, I is domestic interest rate, p is domestic price, 1* is foreign
interest rate, Bi sexpectedrate ofdepreciation, y is domestic real income, and W is domestic
nominal wealth. In addition, we have four identity equations to complete the model.
= NFA + NDA (5)
ANFA=TC+CA (6)
TC = ABFs - A B*d - k(TB) (7)
W=M+B0+B* (8)
Here, NFA is net foreign asset ofthe central bank, NDA is net domestic asset ofthe
centralbank, TC is capital inflow, CA is current account surplus and k which is a function of
trade account surplus (TB) is trade -connected capital flows such as trade credits, advances under
red-clause L/C, and so on. Assuming infinity elasticity offoreign demand for domestic financial
assets,we getto the following reduced-formcapital inflow equation through comparative static
18analysis with equilibrium conditions in each asset market.
11 ~ -aJ.~ iXi = ANDA + CA + i +E
L~-~3H.+aJ. L~-~H~+czJ~ L~-~H1+aJ~
- L~+aJ~ ~J+L iXW + (A~H-AaJ)--k
L~-13H+aJ. L~-~H~+aJ~ L,-I3H~+aJ~
~H-aJ. ~H.—aJ. (RH.* -aJ. * )(~H.—aJ.)
TC = II LINDA + I 1 CA + Ii ~J~’ 1 1 LI(i*+E)
L~-~H.+aJ. L~—~H~+aJ1 L~—~H,+aJ~
(L +aJ)(13H-aJ.) ~J +L L.
-[ 3’ 3’ 11 +J]Ay-[ WW +J]LIW+ I (LI~H-AaJ)
L1
- ~H.+~xJ. ~‘ L1





The capital flow equation derived above shows that capital transactions are motivated
by domestic monetary policy(ANDA), current account situation(CA),portfolio behaviorofthe
private sector(A(I*+E)4y4W), capital market liberalization(L43H - LsaJ), and trade.
Appendix 2
Notes onthe data
This appendix describesthe dataseries underling the estimates presentedin this paper.
We employ the following abbreviations:
19MBBOK = Monthly Bulletin ofthe Bank ofKorea
IFS = International Finance Statistics
FFK = Flows ofFunds in Korea
(1) capital flow equation
STC: surplus on short-termcapital account, in millions of dollars. Source:MBBOK
LTC: surplus on long-term capital account, in millions of dollars. Source:MBBOK
ERR: errors and omissions, in millions ofdollars. Source: MBBOK
CA: current account surplus, in millions ofdollars. Source:MBBOK
B: high-poweredmoney, in billions ofwon. Source:MBBOK
NFA: net foreign assets ofthe Bank ofKorea, in billions ofwon including DOME.
Source: MBBOK
DOME: depositoftheBank ofKorea atdomestic banks in foreign currency which is
countedas one ofthe net domestic assets ofthe Bank ofKorea, in billions of
won. Source: MBBOK.
NDA: net domestic assets ofthe Bank ofKorea, in billions ofwon.
Calculated as AB - ANFA. Source:MBBOK
q: reserve requirementratio(quarterly average). Source:MBBOK
L: total deposits ofdeposit moneybanks, in billions ofwon(quarterlyaverage).
Source: MBBOK
20A RR: change in reserve requirements. Calculated as (q1-q~..1)*L1~1
1*: London Interbank OfferRates on US dollardeposits(3 month maturity). Source: IFS
B : expected depreciation rate ofwon. Generated from the following estimated
equation. Source:MBBOK
B = 0.004 - 0.5 12 CA/B1 R2= 0.526, DW = 1.828
(2.29) (7.89)
y : realGross National Product in billions ofwon(1985=100) Source: MBBOK
W: nominal wealth in billions ofwon. The series is the sum ofgovernment bonds,
money(M2) and foreign asset ownedby private sectorincluding banking sector.
Source: FFK
(2) monetary policy reaction function
BUDDEFT: government budgetdeficit, in billions ofwon. Source:MBBOK
GIPI: growthrate ofindustrial production during the previous quarter. Calculated using
industrial productionindex in Korea(l990=lOO). Source: MBBOK
REER: real effective exchange rate index in Korea(l985= 100). Calculated based on
exchange rates and CPIs ofseven major tradingpartners(U.S., Japan,
England, Germany, Canada, Singapore, Taiwan).
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